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JUDGE JEROME FRANK AND LEGAL REALISM:
AN APPRAISAL
EDWARD McWHINNEY

JIEoiM FRANK who died on January 13th, 1957, was probably
the foremost figure among the American Legal Realists and certainly
one of the great legal thinkers of the present century. He was one
of the band of young legal intellectuals who came to Washington with
Franklin Roosevelt at the outset of the New Deal. He was not, in
the early days, one of that inner circle of policy-makers-later to be
dubbed the "Brain Trust'. However, by the close of Mr. Roosevelt's
second term he had advanced to the Chairmanship of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In some respects he was atypical of the
younger "Young Turks" in the Roosevelt entourage. He was a Middle
Westerner and a graduate of the University of Chicago rather than
of an Ivy League school, and he had already made a reputation before reaching Washington-both in professional practice in Chicago
and also as author in his spare time of the controversial and brilliant
"Law and the Modern Mind".- President Roosevelt appointed him
to the bench in 1941 as a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This court was widely regarded in the
United States (and also in the other Common Law countries) as
the "strongest English-speaking court". This was in the form of a
tribute to the extraordinary quality of the personnel of the Court which
included at the time Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, Thomas W. Swan,
and Charles E. Clark and also a recognition of the fact that since the
EDWARD McWn IMEY is Associate Professor of Law, University of Toronto, and
formerly Professor of Law, New York Law School.
I FRANi, LAW AND TH3 MODERN MIND (New York 1930). Other monographs published by Judge Frank include: Save America First (New York 1938); If Men Were
Angels (New York 1942) ; Fate and Freedom (New York 1945) ; Courts on Trial (Princeton 1949).
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passage of the Judiciary Act in 1925 and the practical confining of the
United States Supreme Court to public law matters, the United States
Courts of Appeals have become in effect the final appellate tribunals
for American private law questions.
Judge Frank's career indicated the range and variety of his interests. His activities were so extensive that, in spite of his extraordinary energies and abilities, he never quite reached the limit of his
potential in any one avocation, except as a legal publicist. He never
made the transition from the highest civil service executive rank to
a Cabinet post; he did not obtain the appointment from the United
States Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court as did his junior in
the Second Circuit, Justice Harlan, in 1954. Perhaps if Adlai Stevenson had been elected in 1952 or 1956, he would have achieved this
distinction. In spite of his intellectual stature he never held a
chair in a major American law school. However, after his elevation to
the bench he began giving regular lecture courses each semester at
the Yale Law School which he continued for more than a decade up
to his death. This was an extra-judicial activity for which, it is submitted that he was the pioneer in modern times. Judge Charles E.
Clark has followed him at Yale and Judge Calvert Magruder at Harvard. As a legal publicist Judge Frank reached his highest intellectual permanence. Roscoe Pound, no doubt, was a more systematic
and thorough scholar, but Judge Frank had also the gift of vivid and
often pungent expression that was unrivaled. Through his wife, Florence Kiper Frank, a poetess in her own right, Judge Frank had entree,
as a young Chicago lawyer, to the more significant avant-gardeliterary and artistic groups of the post-war America.
The key to the "American Legal Realist movement" is to be found
in the more general intellectual turmoil of the 1920's, outside the
closed realms of lawyers and law teachers. For Legal Realism was in
essence a state of mind rather than a dogma of doctrine or proposition: an index to this can be found in the insistence of some of the
leaders of the Realists that they were not a school in any organized or
accepted sense but individuals whose views happened to coincide on
many important issues.2 The Legal Realists of the 1920s were essen2 FRANK, LAW AND T

MODEPM MIND Vii-Viii

(New York 1949): "1made a blunder,

leading to misunderstandings, [in the first printing in 1930] when I employed the phrase

'legal realism" to label the position, concerning the work of the courts, which I took
in this book.... But, in 1931, less than a year after this book appeared, I published
an article stating regrets at the use of this label. . . . I then suggested that the legal
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tially debunkers, iconoclasts, and rebels against an established legal
order in the United States which they saw as having enshrined a rigid
and mechanical positivism comparable to the Begriffsjurisprudenz of
Windscheid and the Pandectists of 19th century Germany. Through
the Realists' eyes, judges (and to some extent law schools) were seen
as insisting that the problems of judicial decision-making were to find
law and never to make it; that so far as private law was concerned
there was to be found, floating in the medieval skies, a self-contained
and self-sufficient body of Common Law doctrine relevant and immediately applicable to present-day needs; that so far as public law was
concerned, the Founding Fathers had enshrined "right reason" in the
text of the constitutional instrument of 1787 and later in the postCivil War Amendments, and that the task of contemporary generations was simply to reason syllogistically from the Constitution's lapidarian phrases to resolve current socio-economic issues and their tensions.
Several points may be made here in regard to the Realists' approach. First, it must be conceded that theirs was a rather oversimplified presentation of the traditional conception of the judicial
process,--that the Realists had to some extent set up a tactical strawman for themselves to knock down in their struggle against legal
orthodoxy. Again, it must be acknowledged that others apart from the
Realists were reacting against the existing legal order: Dean Roscoe
Pound, for example, for some years had been presenting his own special
thesis: legal decision-making involved the balancing of a number of
conflicting interests pressed by individuals and groups in society, pointing towards an ultimate resolution of the conflict in terms of that solution that would most accord with the dominant trends in societal development. Pound's jurisprudence would have provided, of course, criteria for criticism of the methods and procedures of actual decisionmaking of American courts of the era, in so far as those decisions were
realists be called "constructive skeptics", and their attitude, "constructive skepticism".
There was a more cogent reason for regretting the use of "realist" as a method
of ticketing these legal skeptics. The label enabled some of their critics to bracket
the realists as a homogeneous "school", in virtual accord with one another on all or most
subjects. This misconception-not certainly the result of any careful reading of their
works-led to the specious charge that the "realist school" embraced fantastically inconsistent ideas. Actually no such school existed.
".... These so-called realists have but one common bond, a negative characteristic already noted: skepticism as to some of the conventional legal theories, a skepticism stimulated by a zeal to reform, in the interests of justice, some court-house
ways$.
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in no sense expressed in the written opinions filed in support thereof,
as being based on consideration of the interests pressed by the parties
to the respective cases. However, it needed the Legal Realists to present the problem in dramatic, clear-cut, terms which the public at large
could understand. It was the Legal Realists who challenged the cult
of the robe3 in successfully "exposing" the "myth" that judicial decision-making could be reduced to a matter of logic alone. The Legal
Realists explored the gap between what judges actually did in deciding cases, and what they said they did in their subsequent opinions:
the syllogism might be the official basis for judicial approach to solution of cases, but the judgments would all too frequently be determined, in the choice between alternative, conflicting legal propositions.
Justice Holmes categorized these as "inarticulate major premises"
stemming from a judge's cultural and group affiliations,-political,
social, and economic. Put in the rather over-simplified, political terms
of the angry 1930's,--if the conservative majority of one on the Supreme Court was persisting in invalidating major legislative planks of
the Roosevelt New Deal, this was not because such a result was necessary and inevitable in terms of the Constitution; the judges were simply injecting, their own (conservative) economic values into the Constitution as a means of defeating the popular verdict of the polls, and
under cover of a spurious logical interpretation.
The final defeat of the Old Court majority in the exiciting events
of 1937 represented, no doubt, the apogee of the Legal Realists'
achievements. Curiously enough, though many of them were politically minded and probably most of them were also Democrats, they were
not as a whole public lawyers. In general they had no well thought
out and articulated philosophy of judicial review to offer the New
Court that rapidly assumed power after 1937. The New Court's
floundering, (especially during the eras of the Stone and the Vinson
Chief Justiceships which were characterizedby multiple dissents, special
3 FRAiq, CouRTs ox T=m_. 255 (Princeton 1949): "The judges were oracles of an
impersonal "higher law," a body of "law" absolute and infallible-so believed many
who sponsored the judge's gown. Therefore, this garment of sacerdotal origin was
appropriate, clothing its wearer with the dignity that befits the augur. Others, more skeptical of the law's dignity, nevertheless appreciated the public effect of priestly trappings. They were astute in this perception. In the minds of altogether too many persons
the judicial garb inspires excessive awe. Hughes, as Secretary of State, was fallible;
Van Devanter, as Solicitor for Interior, was not beyond criticism. But as judges, clad
in their solemn black silk, they automatically became (for much of the public) if not
as sacred as once was Japan's Emperor, at least brushed with divinity."
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concurrences and extremes of factionalism-in search of a common set
of judicial values or at least a minimum modus vivendi, can in part
be explained by the fact that the Legal Realists, predominantly private lawyers, had nothing further to give the Court once the Court
revolution and the overthrow of the laissez-faire Constitution had been
achieved. In the area of private law, once the necessary mental attitude of skepticism had been inculcated in the students as to the traditional theory of the judicial process, the way was open to the introduction of Pound's interests-oriented approach. The Legal Realists
themselves, being not always or even generally members of the sociological school also began to concentrate on applied jurisprudence(field projects pitched at a fairly low level of abstraction and usually
rigorously empirical and detailed in method). Thus Professor Douglas (later Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court)
had entered as early as 1930 on his monumental survey of bankruptcies and business failures; Professor Llewellyn embarked on his commercial codes research; Professor Underhilll Moore undertook such
projects as the New Haven Green traffic study; Professor Frank, after
refining his earlier theories so as to distinguish between "rule skepticism" and "fact skepticism", 4 seemed somewhat to retreat from an
earlier, almost free-law-finding view of the judicial process, 5 and to
concern himself instead with the problems of fact-finding in litigation, particularly at the trial level, perhaps in reaction to the extremities of language and thought of some of the other Realists. 6 Of course,
occupation with the heavy burdens of his Judgeship increasingly isolated Judge Frank, while still quite young, from opportunities for
that sustained reflection necessary to the development of any new
philosophic theory that might build on his early Realist ideas. Nevertheless Judge Frank was aware in his later years that the original con4 FRANx,

LAW AND THE MODERN Mmn viii-x (New York 1949); Frank, Cardozo

and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAw AND CoNTEmP. PROB. 369 (1948).

5 See note 3 supra, at 286: ". . . Although many persons (myself included) believe that the theory of precedents ought to be restated so as to conform more nearly
with precedent practice, no sensible person suggests that stare decisis be abandoned."
That this statement most nearly reflected his considered attitude towards the judicial
process was indicated by Judge Frank in a letter to the present writer dated January
11th, 1957.
6 Frank himself admitted some years ago that if doing LAw AND THE MODERN
Mnm again, he would not write it exactly as he had first done in 1930. FRANK, LAw ANID
THE MODERN MIND vi (New York 1949). Compare Patterson's suggestion that Frank's

earlier statements about logic in law were aimed at exaggerated claims of rationalists,
especially of Adler. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS Or THE LAW 545 (New

York 1953).
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ditions in North America of the 1920's and 1930's that had made Legal
Realism viable, and also challenging and exciting, as a philosophy of
law were no longer present. New and complex socio-political tension
issues existed at the present day for which Legal Realism could provide no solution; a new, affirmative philosophy was what was needed.
He had begun to delve into questions of comparative or integrative
jurisprudence, 7 though he was much too penetrating a scholar to be
deceived by that shallow eclecticism (the ventures into purely mechanical comparisons or taxonomies of institutions and rules of various countries without regard to the political, social, and economic conditions from which they are spawned) to be found in so many of the
courses in comparative law that are now creeping into the North
American law school curriculum. He rightly recognised that the comparative study of law, unless it is undertaken against a broad background of the social sciences, is pretentious and foolish, and also substantially useless.8
Mention has been made of Judge Frank's sympathies and affiliations with the younger American literary leaders of the 1920's. There
was in his temperament and style of writing something of the spirit
of H. L. Mencken, in spite of the frequent superficialities of the latter
and of the disparities in the two men's backgrounds. However, Frank
was extraordinarily well read, in traditional American, English, and
especially Continental works. His writings are replete, as was his conversation, with literary allusions. He was probably most at home with
Rabelais, finding a bond of sympathy with his earthy humanism and
jovial irreverence. Judge Frank was a Jew,-conscious and proud
of his affiliation. It was perhaps for this reason he felt especially free
to disagree violently, if need be, with other jurists of the same faith.
Thus he scarified Professor Goodhart in words that were especially
wounding in the present age of intellectual flux as a "safe-and-sound"
legal thinker; 9 though perhaps here he did him less than justice in not
seeing him in his particular space-time context; 10 likewise, he had little
7 Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. or PA. L. Ray. 887 (1956).
8 Id. at 916. This point is foreshadowed by Judge Frank in a letter to the
present writer dated September 2nd, 1952.
9 FRAxx, CouTms oN TRAL 63 (Princeton 1949); and compare Goodhart's indignant
reply, Goodhart, Frank, Courts on Trial, 67 L.Q.R. 535 (1951).
10 Thus there is reason for believing that Dr. Goodhart, as an American teaching
in England, was seeking in the elaboration of his rules for determining the ratio decidendi of a case, to assist the process of sterilising unwanted precedents: his rules,
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sympathy for Mr. Justice Frankfurter as one who aspired in the Supreme Court to wear Mr. Justice Holmes' liberal mantle-had not Judge
Frank himself set Holmes up as his model of the "completely adult
jurist"? 1 Frank tended to view Mr. Justice Frankfurter's philosophy
of judicial review as a sort of conservatism by indirection. Judge
Frank was, of course, in all his writings and teachings, a man who
responded quickly and warm-bloodedly to issues and personalities,
and thus, he had little time or patience for judicial periphrasis, or
for the veiled tactic, however laudable the ultimate objectives to which
it might be directed. His more recently developed interest in the social
sciences' might have helped him to bridge the gap here. Some greater
disposition to recognize the role of the Supreme Court as one part only
of the institutional framework of government in the United States
might thus have brought him closer to Mr. Justice Frankfurter whose
judicial approach rests, after all, in the ultimate, on a special conception of the Supreme Court's responsibilities and occasional duties of
self-restraint vis-h-vis the co-ordinate arms of government. It seems
doubtful, however, that Judge Frank would ever have embraced Justice Frankfurter's philosophy; his own conception of the responsibilities of the "adult" jurist impelled him inevitably to an activist role.
But except for a keen interest and knowledge of psychology, Judge
Frank was a humanist in his approach and not a social scientist, any
more than the bulk of the Legal Realists; we are apt to forget, in this
regard, how recent in its impact, is the campaign for integration of
law with the other social sciences and how few, still, are those who
are adequately equipped, intellectually, for inter-disciplinary research
and teaching. Judge Frank recognised that this type of approach,
properly applied, would be indispensable to the solution of the great
community issues of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras: he also
insofar as when applied they must limit or narrow the grounds of decision of any case,
are peculiarly attuned to the operational needs of the device of "distinguishing" cases
in effect forced on the English judges by the extreme strictness of the English doctrine
of stare decisis. See Goodhart's remarks in 220 LAW Timms 1 (1955).
11 FRANK, LAW AND TiE MODERN MiN 253 et seq. (New York 1930).
12 Frank had, of course, a rich acquaintance with and knowledge of contemporary
writings in psychology, and can rightly be regarded as the pioneer in the psychological
method as applied to law. His famous characterisation of the "legal-certainty-myth",
in LAw NDim a MODE= MnmD (New York 1930) p. 20 et seq., had a manifest root in
Freudianism. Nevertheless, for one who had a most active career in public administration,
particularly in the area of governmental regulation of business, he showed surprisingly
little interest in the secondary literature in the basic Social Sciences, especially Political
Science and Economics.

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

(VOL. 3

recognised that some further work on methodological aspects might
eliminate barriers currently existing between the policy-oriented
thinkers and the older Realist and Sociological groups13 and produce
a new synthesized American jurisprudence for the second half of the
century, in place of the current rather atomized and factionalized
4
assortment of doctrines and techniques.1
How important were the Legal Realists to legal history and
thought in North America? Unlike parallel Continental movements
and thinkers-for example, the Free-Law Movement associated in
the Germanic countries with Ehrlich, and also G~ny and his followers in France-the American Legal Realists offered only a theory
of the judicial process and had no firm set of values or objectively-verifiable criteria for the solution of concrete case problems
once the fallacies of the orthodox theory of the judicial process had
been exposed and the opportunities for creative, law-making choice on
the part of the judicial decision-maker demonstrated. It is doubtful, of course, granted the varied natures and personalities of the
leaders of the Realist movement, that they could have reached agreement on any uniform method or standards for solving cases: it is even
more doubtful whether they would have even wanted to do so. Their
prime function as a group, as they saw it, was to inculcate skepticism
in the mind of judge, lawyer, teacher, and student; such a skeptical
frame of mind would sweep away cobwebs, expose "inarticulate major
premises" that might otherwise, (unknown to the decision-maker concerned) determine the solution of cases, and leave the decision-maker
free from his inhibitions and able accordingly to make the "best" solution: what that solution might be, presumably, did not matter so
long as the decision-maker was fully aware of the predispositional and
environmental factors operating on his choice and did not conceal
them in his opinion. Stated in these terms Legal Realism approximates in many respects to a new form of Legal Positivism,"5 though
13 See note 7 supra, at 905, letter from Judge Frank to the present writer dated
October 12th, 1956.
14 Frank was aware of course of the dangers of going to the other extreme and
seeking to introduce an "excessive planetary uniformity which would efface desirable
differences in cultural values and monopolistically obstruct local originalities, initiatives, inventive creations. . . . There remains . . . an ultimate wisdom in Horace Xallen's oft-repeated warning that true democracy calls for an orchestration of differing
attitudes-in which some unresolved cacophonies play a part-not for a stifling regimented unity." See note 7 supra, at 924.
15 Cf. FULLER, THE LAw iN QuEsT OF ITSELF 51-2 (Chicago 1940).
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on a much more sophisticated, scientific and objective basis than in
the heretofore existing schools of analytical jurisprudence; and presumably so far as it remains a continuing influence in American legal
theory, this will be the way that Legal Realism may go in the future.
Politically, the contribution of the Legal Realists was much more
significant and far-reaching than that. It was they who triggered the
successful reaction of the late 1920's and the 1930's, in both the private law and public law spheres, against the hegemony of traditional
analytical positivism and "black-letter" law, paving the way for the
current dominion of sociological jurisprudence in which decision of
cases proceeds on resolution of interests-conflicts. Without the Legal
Realists' exciting, red-blooded impact, it is doubtful whether the
Sociological jurisprudes, solid and sober citizens all, could have taken
over so quickly or so completely. The poets may have started the
revolution, but it was a different personality-type, (the administrator
class) who consolidated the gains and built a durable regime.
It may be said, that the legal revolution could not have been
achieved in the United States without the Realists because the German
Interessenjurisprudenz, starting much earlier and on much stronger
intellectual and philosophical foundations than the American sociological school, had not in any way approached a position of dominence
in Germany by the time Hitier came into power in 1933. The Nazi
jurists were, it is true, able to utilize the concepts of "Zweck"-oriented, purposive, jurisprudence in some measure to further their special
"Volk" ends, but it has not been until well after World War II that
the balancing of interests approach has been markedly noticeable in
German Supreme Court jurisprudence, and then, it may be suspected,
it has come, second-hand, from Dean Pound via a reading of American Supreme Court cases, rather than from von Ihering, Stammler,
Kohler, Heck, and the other German forebears of the sociological approach. And so the cycle would seem to have been completed: Dean
Pound took his basic ideas from German legal theory, and they have
returned to Germany once again with two World Wars and half a century intervening: the comparatively greater strength (in comparison
to the United States of America) of the cult of the robe in Germany,
plus the absence of any such politically powerful group of witty,
irreverent legal iconoclasts as the American Realists'0 delayed and in
16 It is to be conceded that just as the German Interests-school preceded in point

of time the American sociological school, so the Continental Free-Law movement also
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substantial degree frustrated until the present day the revolt, against
Begriffsjurisprudenz in Germany. The needs of contemporary generations for an affirmative legal philosophy that will provide active
guides to the solution of policy conflicts, 17 should not impair recognition of the achievements of the Legal Realists in purging North
American law once and for all of time-worn encrustations and survivals, fictions, and cloudy and confused modes of thinking.
anticipated the main substance of the American Realists' arguments by a number of
years: but, in comparison with the American Realist group, the Continental Free-Law
jurists were usually neither witty nor irreverent, and they failed to excite the general
community support necessary to any successful political challenge to the traditional
legal order.
17 Cf. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, SO YALE
L.J. 827 (1941); Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). McDougal, The Law
School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community,
56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947).
One might comment here also on the fundamentalist tendencies to be observed in
the published works over the last decade or so of Dean Roscoe Pound, a seeming
contradiction of the relativist emphasis of Pound's earlier sociological work; and on
similar fundamentalist aspects of the work of younger legal writers like Lon Fuller,
Jerome Hall, and Edmond Cahn.

